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　民主台灣應該繼續擁有選擇其未來的自由。歐巴瑪總統即將訪問北京一事，不免讓我們回想過去柯林頓總統在1998年6月訪問所做的憾事。

　在當年稍早，外傳美國政府將向中國保證：假使台灣宣佈獨立，美國將不防衛台灣。3月13日，奈伊（Joseph Nye）在其《華盛頓郵報》專欄中提醒：假使台灣宣佈獨立，則美國應消除其模糊立場，不承認、也不防衛台灣。

　我在《日本時報》專欄中反對此一政策，並直接向在東京陪伴正為了總統訪問中國，而準備前往北京的國務卿Albright之助理國務卿Stanley Roth反應。我的意見是：假使台灣宣佈獨立而中國使用武力，如美國立場正像奈伊所講那樣，我不知道美國民眾與國會是否會接受你們拋棄一個「民主台灣」給中國。假使不是，這等於在誘使中國發動戰爭。這和韓戰的發生有異曲同工之處。當時美國聲明南韓在美國的防衛圈之外，但在北韓相信美國的話而發動攻擊後，美國又出兵干預。

　我不知道我的意見是否產生任何影響，但當時並無不防衛台灣的聲明出爐。然後，在總統訪中的第一天晚上，開始有傳言總統將承諾「三不」，即美國將反對台灣獨立、一中一台政策，以及反對台灣加入以國家為會員資格的國際組織。所幸，總統並未在聯合記者會或北京大學的重要政策演講中提及「三不」。但，柯林頓總統又回馬一槍的在順道拜訪上海時，在與中國的知識份子的電視對話中宣稱一次「三不」。

　雖然美國參、眾兩院的國會迅速以決議案的方式否決此一承諾，中國仍可視此「三不」為美國總統的承諾，從而要求歐巴瑪總統再度予以重申。

　幕後很可能有不可告人的交易。從訪問的時間來看，美國期望藉此轉移國內醜聞的焦點，於是，柯林頓總統越過日本與韓國，在單一國家停留最長時間的訪問中說出「三不」。上海的電視訪問中，主題應該是討論文化議題，卻被突然改變。

　在美中37年交往的歷史中，美國一向無法堅持反對一黨獨裁的立場，反而是一吋一吋的讓步。美國每次都向民眾表示美國的立場並未改變。

　令人疑惑的是，透過柯林頓總統的作為可看出美國的立場鬆動。他雖然評論「三不」只不過是重申美國對台政策，但並未界定評論的時間，是他在北京的會議中或是多久前做的。國家安全顧問Sandy Berger說明，美國只是重複其基本立場而已。

　事實上，美國已經轉變其立場。這是從1972年國家安全顧問季辛吉的聲明起頭的：「美國認知台灣海峽兩岸的所有中國人主張只有一個中國，而台灣是中國的一部份」。這句話非常機巧，但遇上台灣宣佈獨立的場景話，會顯得已經過時。從1983年開始，美國已經透過否認追求「兩個中國」或「一中、一台」而從這立場退讓。

　「追求」一語隱含著計劃、從事以及鼓勵，但並不阻止美國接受台灣獨立的「既成事實」。只是，在柯林頓總統1998年訪中時所說「不支持」的用語，暗示得更明顯，《華盛頓郵報》編輯解釋，這是台灣人民最終的選項。

　當時美國向台灣再度保證的是「不支持」，而不是「反對」。事實上，「反對」是中國在布希政府執政期間不斷吵著要的議題。中國對內吹噓已經獲得美國的承諾，但是，在外交文件上卻非如此。

　歐巴瑪訪中最好的是不要超越三公報的範圍。重申「三不」不是他的底線，這個「三不」已經被美國國會否決。千萬不可將「不支持」偷偷改為「反對」。

　順便一提的是，日本政府在過去37年中從未對其「理解並尊重中國立場」上有所讓步。（岡崎久彥是日本駐沙烏地阿拉伯與泰國的大使，現主持岡崎研究所的一個智庫）

Don't concede more on Taiwan　by Hisahiko Okazaki

　For those who are concerned that the democratic Taiwan should continue to have the freedom to choose its own future, President Obama's coming visit to Beijing brings back the memory of a regrettable episode during President Clinton's visit to China in June 1998.

　Early in the spring of that year there were signs that the American Government would assure China that the United States would not defend Taiwan if she declared independence. On March 13, Joseph Nye proposed in Washington Post op-ed eliminating ambiguity in the American position and by starting that the United States would not recognize or defend Taiwan, if it were to declare independence.

　I argued against such a policy in an op-ed in the Japan Times and directly to Assistant Secretary Stanley Roth in Tokyo when he was accompanying Secretary Albright on her way to Beijing for the preparation of the Presidential visit. My argument was as follows: “Suppose Taiwan declared independence and China used forced, believing in the American statement of its position, I wonder whether the American public and the Congress would acquiesce in abandoning a free and democratic Taiwan to China. If not, it is tantamount to tricking China into a war. It would be similar to how the Korean War began. The United States declared that South Korea is outside its defense line, but intervened when the North launched an attack, having possibly believed in your words.” 

　I do not know whether my arguments had any influence, but there were no statements about not defending Taiwan then. Then on the eve of the President's visit, stories began to circulate that the President was going to commit “three NOs,” that the US would oppose Taiwan independence, one-China-one-Taiwan policy and Taiwan's formal membership in state-based international organizations. Fortunately, there was no mention of “three NOs” in the joint press conference, nor in the major policy speech at the Bejing University. Then the volte-face came. Dropping by in Shanghai, the President declared the “three NO's” in a dialogue with Chinese intellectuals on a TV show.

　Although the US Congress quickly rejected the commitment through resolutions of both Houses, China may still view the remark as an official commitment of the President of the United States and may quite likely expect President Obama to reconfirm it.

　It is not difficult at all to suspect that there were some disgraceful deals behind the scenes. The date of the visit, to start with, is believed to have been besought by the US to turn attention away from a domestic scandal, and that indebted the US to say three NOs and bypass Japan and Korea while making the longest trip that Clinton made to a single country. The topics to be discussed during the Shanghai TV interview, which had originally been planned to concentrate on cultural affairs, seemed to have been changed at short notice.

　Through the 37 year history of US-China engagement, the United States has consistently retreated in the war of semantics ob Taiwan. The United States has been unable to muster points against the steel wall of one-party dictatorship. They lost inch by inch every time. However, each time, the Americans reassured the public that the US position hadn’t changed.

　How deceptively the US position had eroded can be seen in the comments made by President Clinton. He began his remarks on the “three NOs” by stating that he was reiterating the American policy on Taiwan but not specifying the time of the previous remarks, whether it was during his meetings in Beijing or some unknown time ago. The National Security Adviser Sandy Berger explained that the United States had simply repeated its basic position.

　In fact, the United States has kept on shifting its position. It started with an admirably objective statement by Dr. Henry Kissinger, National Security Adviser, in 1972. “The US acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China”. This was cleverly phrased but would have become obsolete were Taiwan to declare independence. The retreat from this position began in 1983 by denying the intention of pursuing a policy of “two Chinese” or “One China, One Taiwan”.

　The word “pursuing” implies planning, working for, and encouraging, but it does not prevent the US from accepting a fait accompli of Taiwan's independence. However, there is a more clear implication in the term “not support” used during Clinton's visit of 1998, which is well explained in the editorials of the Washington Post among option that the Taiwan people eventually might choose. 

　The American reassurance to Taiwan at that time was that “not support” does not mean “oppose”. In fact “oppose” is the term coveted by China all through the Bush administration. China boasts domestically that it has won the commitment from the US, but no diplomatic record is yet to testify to such a position.

　In the coming visit of President Obama, the best is not to go beyond the three communiqué's. The bottom line is not to reconfirm the “three NOs”, which is already denied by Congress. Never accept the change from “not support” to “oppose”.

　Incidentally, the Japanese Government, perhaps uncharacteristically, has never conceded an inch from its stand to “understand and respect the Chinese position” in the past 37 years.

　Hisahiko Okazaki was Japanese ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand. He now runs the Okazaki Institute, a think-tank.（Published by “ ACFR NewsGroup No.1528, Tuesday, October 27,2009）